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RECENT DECISIONS
ences.9 An inference, however, is not a conclusion which the jury
must reach.10 But since an inference must be based on a proved
fact," it cannot be the foundation of another inference.' 2 The ad-
mission of the judgment roll in this case would allow the jury to base
an inference upon an inference. 13
J. A. R., JR.
HoMTCIDE-UNcoRRoBoRATED DYING DECLARATION OF VICTIM
-IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT.-The appellant was convicted of
murder in the first degree. Deceased was shot from behind and
no one testified to any act on the part of deceased indicating that
he turned around or saw his assailant. Appellant was not connected
with the crime by eye witnesses. The only evidence offered which
might tend to show that appellant was the man who did the shooting
was a dying declaration.- Held, reversed, the dying declaration is
insufficient to support a conviction where other evidence of the iden-
tity of the murderer is unsatisfactory. People v. Ludkowitz, 266
N. Y. 233, N. E. (1935).
People v. Loomis, 170 Cal. 347, 149 Pac. 581 (1915); Pribble v. People, 49
Colo. 210, 112 Pac. 220 (1910); State v. Curtin, 28 Dela. 518, 95 Atl. 232
(1914); Johnson v. State, 57 Fla. 18, 49 So. 40 (1909); State v. Wetter, 11
Idaho 433, 83 Pac. 341 (1905) ; People v. Spencer, 264 Ill. 124, 106 N. E. 219
(1914) ; State v. Thomas, 172 Iowa 485, 154 N. W. 768 (1915) ; Ford v. State,
73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665 (1896); State v. Hill, 65 N. J. Law 626, 47 AtI. 814
(1901) ; Maas v. Territory, 10 Okla. 714, 63 Pac. 960 (1901) ; King v. State,
91 Tenn. 617, 20 S. W. 169 (1892); State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134
Pac. 632 (1913) ; State v. Harris, 74 Wash. 60, 132 Pac. 735 (1913) ; State v.
Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 Pac. 806 (1907); McNaughten's Case, 1 C. & K.
130, Note a (1843).
Knowledge of the Law, Brunaugh v. State, 173 Ind. 483, 90 N. E. 1019
(1910); State v. Jones, 118 La. 369, 42 So. 967 (1907); Crain v. State, 69
Tex. Cr. 55, 153 S. W. 155 (1913); Taff v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. 528, 155 S. W.
214 (1913).
o Since the defendant has the benefit of the presumption of innocence, the
court cannot compel the jury to find any fact detrimental to the defendant.
10 Supra note 7, definition of inference.
n Ibid.
"Every inference must be based upon some fact or facts which have
already been proved; it may not be based upon another inference. Lamb v.
Union Ry. Co., 195 N. Y. 260, 88 N. E. 371 (1909) ; Warner v. New York, 0.
& W. Ry., 209 App. Div. 211, 204 N. Y. Supp. 607 (4th Dept. 1924) ; Plotnick
v. Plotnick, 185 App. Div. 15, 172 N. Y. Supp. 584 (lst Dept. 1918).
"Using the judgment roll the jury could infer that this contract was
unenforceable and, with this as a basis, they could infer that it was secured by
the same means; and further, that since this defendant was the agent for the
Union for procuring the contracts he was the party who exercised the coercion
and uttered the threats.
'Made in response to questions written on a regulation police blank.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The rule governing the admission of dying declarations con-
stitutes an exception to the general rule of evidence which prohibits
the receipt in evidence of hearsay statements.2 The general rule is
also to the effect that the deceased must at the time of the declara-
tion be under the sense of impending death and without any hope
of recovery.3 Whether the preliminary proof advanced is sufficient
to admit the receipt in evidence of a dying declaration presents in
each case a question which must be determined by the trial judge.4
While the preliminary proof may be sufficient to permit the intro-
duction in evidence of the dying declaration still, if it be not clear
and satisfactory, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as
to the weight to be given to such declaration. 5 Dying declarations,
when admitted, are not always regarded as of the same value and
weight as the testimony of a witness given in open court and under
the sanction of an oath.6 They are received of necessity, in order
to prevent a failure of justice upon the theory that the belief of
impending death is equivalent to an oath.7 But in spite of the court's
reluctance to accept the burden of expressly stating so,8 a dying
declaration unsupported by other evidence is insufficient to sustain
judgment of conviction. 9 The jury should be instructed that the
statement was not to be considered as having the same probative
value as the testimony of a witness in open court, subject to cross-
examination."° The reason for receiving dying declarations in evi-
dence should be explained so the jury may be in a position properly
to weigh the evidence in arriving at a verdict." Inasmuch as these
declarations are substituted for sworn testimony it follows that they
must be such narrativq statements as a witness might properly give
on the stand if living.12 The declarant must have had actual knowl-
2 Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 54 Sup. Ct. 22 (1933); People
v. Sarzano, 212 N. Y. 231, 106 N. E. 81 (1914); People v. Falletto, 202 N. Y.
494, 96 N. E. 355 (1911).
1 Supra note 2.
'People v. Smith, 104 N. Y. 491, 10 N. E. 873 (1887) ; People v. Kraft,
148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80 (1896) ; People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85
N. E. 690 (1908).
'Instant case; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§1440, 1441, 1442.
'Armstrong v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 162 (1930); People v. Corey,
157 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 1024 (1898).
'WooD, PRACTICE EVIDENCE (2d ed.) 326: "A charge that it was the
jury'i duty to take a dying declaration into consideration as competent testi-
mony as it had all the sanction of evidence that the law could ascribe to
evidence was held to be error"; People v. Kraft, supra note 4.
'Instant case at 240.
" People v. Kraft, supra note 4; People v. Corey, supra note 6; People v.
Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10, 46 N. E. 1046 (1897); People v. Pignataro, 263 N. Y.
229, 188 N. E. 720 (1934).
10 Instant case; People v. Corey, supra note 6.
'Armstrong v. United States, supra note 6; State v. Valencia, 19 N. M.
113, 140 Pac. 1119 (1914).
"People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 434 (1874) ; State v. Reed, 137 Mo. 125,
38 S. W. 574 (1897).
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edge or opportunity for observation of the fact which he relates.Y3
A declaration must be rejected when it would be impossible for the
declarant to have had any adequate source of knowledge of his assail-
ant.1 4 To permit a conviction to stand where no motive was shown
for the act, and no evidence corroborating the dying declaration was
offered, would shock one's sense of justice.' 5
J. J. G.
INSURANcE-AERoPLANE ACCIDENT-PASSENGER NOT "PARTI-
CIPATING IN AER0NATIcs."-The life of George W. Martin was
insured by the defendant company. The policy, in which plaintiff
was named as beneficiary, contained a double indemnity clause by
force of which, double indemnity would be payable upon receipt of
due proof that the insured died as a result of bodily injury effected
solely through external, violent and accidental means-provided that
the double indemnity shall not be payable if death resulted-from
"participating in aeronautics." The insurance having been in force
for more than two years the liability of defendant was conceded as
to single indemnity. The insured was invited by one Gregory, an
aeroplane pilot, to accompany him as a guest on a pleasure flight.
While in flight on this trip the aeroplane accidently crashed, killing
the insured instantly. The insured had no knowledge of aviation
and did not, before said accident, use aeroplanes as a means of trans-
portation. Held, a person riding in an aeroplane as an invited guest
is not "participating in aeronautics" within the exclusions of the
double indemnity clause of the above mentioned policy. Martin v.
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 189 Ark. -, 71 S. W. (2d) 694 (1934).
In reaching this decision the court in construing the meaning
of "participating in aeronautics" refused to be bound by the conno-
tation given by those learned in the niceties of language and accus-
tomed to its precise use, but rather considered that meaning which
the majority of the thousands of persons who seek insurance would
understand by the term and considered it as the equivalent to "en-
gaged in aeronautics." Words and phrases used in insurance poli-
cies should be construed by their meaning as used in the ordinary
speech of the people and not as understood by scholars' unless an
artificial or technical meaning was intended to express the mutual
IWalker v. State, 39 Ark. 225 (1882) ; Jones v. State, 52 Ark. 347, 12
S. W. 704 (1889).
"' State v. Wilks, 278 Mo. 481, 213 S. W. 118 (1919) ; State v. Williams,
67 N. C. 12 (1872).
State v. Phillips, 118 Ia. 660, 92 N. W. 876 (1902); People v. White,
251 Ill. 67, 93 N. E. 1036 (1911).
1 Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d)
1081 (1934). See, U. S. Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup.
